Abstract-Security principles, like least privilege, are among the resources in the security body of knowledge that survived the test of time. The implementation of these principles in a software architecture is difficult, as there are no systematic rules on how to apply them in practice. As a result, they are often neglected, which lowers the overall security level of the software system and increases the cost necessary to fix this later in the development life-cycle. This paper improves the support for least privilege in software architectures by (i) defining the foundations to identify potential violations of the principle herein and (ii) elicitating architectural transformations that positively impact the security properties of the architecture, while preserving the semantics thereof. These results have been implemented and validated in a number of case studies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Least privilege (LP) is a well-known security principle that survived the test of time. It prescribes that a user is not assigned permissions that he does not require and, consequently, he cannot execute tasks that he is not allowed to execute [29] . Security principles must be considered throughout the entire software development life-cyle [15] . While several techniques exist to reason about, and improve, the adherence to LP in software, such as policy reasoning [30] or restructuring [6] , no adequate support in the form of a systematic method is available at the architectural level, where the consequences are significant [5] .
This paper argues that, at the architectural level, LP minimizes the capabilities of a (set of) component(s) that is to be executed as a single controllable unit (typically a process). Two important factors in this context are (i) the controllable units and (ii) the access policy that is to be enforced thereon: LP will be best adhered to if both the architectural structure and the policy are adequate (See Figure 1) . Indeed, as shown in the example in the next section, it can be very awkward or even impossible to enforce LP with an inappropriate architecture. Unfortunately, to the authors' knowledge, no systematic techniques exist today to deal with this problem. One of the factors that makes this problem particularly challenging is the abstraction level of a software architecture and, hence, the limited amount of information available for reasoning about LP.
The approach presented in this paper uses a list of use cases and an architectural description to identify and predict LP problems in the final software product. The approach approximates a worst case assignment of permissions given the set of use cases. As represented in Figure 1 we are particularly interested in the architectural structure (without taking into account the access policy), since this ensures LP adherence in the final software system. The computed assignment is used to determine (potential) violations of the principle 1 , which are then solved by architectural transformations. The contributions of the paper are fourfold: (i) a theoretical underpinning of the meaning of LP in software architectures, (ii) an algorithm to identify violations of the principle for an architecture, (iii) an architectural transformation to address a particular category of violations, and (iv) an implementation of the former in a tool.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II further motivates the problem by means of an example. Section III presents the formal foundations of the presented approach. Section IV uses these foundations to identify LP violations. Section V presents a particular transformation to solve a subset of these violations. In Section VI, the approach is applied on a number of case studies. Section VII elaborates on the advantages, the drawbacks, and possible extensions of the approach. Finally, Section VIII discusses the related work, and Section IX concludes.
II. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
Consider an integrated groupware system that consists of three main components (See Figure 2) . The first, Calendar, is a component that enables a user to keep track of events. It also supports finding interesting public events to attend. The second, Repository, is a content management system that allows users to upload files and share these with other users. 1 LP violations at architectural level are potential in the sense that one can never be certain about violations until the system has been fully implemented. For some problems, however, it is almost certain that they will persist in the final system. The third, Tasks, is a todo list and task management component that enables a user to create, update, and delete todo lists and tasks. Two components integrate the functionality of these main components and act as front-ends for end users: the Internal Groupware Client is used by employees, while the External Web Client is used by external users.
External Users use the External Web Client to (i) upload documents used and verified by these employees by means of a verification task, (ii) create public events and, (iii) confirm attendance of events organized by Internal Employees. Internal Employees use the Internal Groupware Client to (i) execute typical groupware related tasks such as add a task to a todo list or modify events, and to (ii) review input received from external users. Table I In order to enforce these requirements in our system, we need to specify an architectural-level access policy that expresses the rules in terms of component's interface methods. Several situations arise in which the current architectural structure jeopardizes or invalidates LP.
First, tasks can overlap such that permissions necessary for a set of tasks are sufficient to execute another task. For instance, if an external user has the right to upload a working document (perm1, perm2 for task T1), he will also be able to add tasks (perm2 for task T5), even though this might not be desirable. More complex overlapping scenarios that are more difficult to identify manually can arise.
Second, the granularity of rights specification in the access policy can be insufficiently fine-grained to grant the right to execute certain tasks, but not other tasks. This is particularly the case when the execution of a task is dependent on method parameters (rather than just methods), or when permissions represent a collection of methods rather than a single method. For instance, the system can not grant a user the right to add public events (T2), but refrain him from add events (T4), as the difference is represented by means of a boolean parameter of a single method. Note that this problem can be solved by increasing the granularity of the access policy, but this is rarely the case in practice.
Third, if two conflicting tasks are able to influence each other's operations, then the system might not be able to enforce LP correctly. Indeed, one can argue that influencing the operations of a task constitutes a weak form of having the permissions to execute it. In the groupware example, the confirmEvent method might for instance interfere with the modifyEvent method, since they probably make use of the same event store. Consequently, task T3 might interfere with task T6. This is not allowed, because external people might not be allowed to influence events based on the company policy.
Solving these issues properly can not be done solely by editing the access policy: a restructuring of the components is often required to address these problems.
III. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS
In this section, a formal model for software architecture is introduced to define the concept of LP (and violations thereof) at architectural level. This will allow us to identify LP problems at this level later on. The model, which was inspired by work of Jie Ren [28] , is modelled in set theory. Only the subset that is relevant for this paper is shown. The complete model is available in a technical report [7] .
The model focusses on the software architecture's component and connector view [10] . Every component c can be described in terms of the actions 2 of its interfaces. These interfaces are used to interact with the component. Such an interaction is intentionally built into the system, often to realize a task (or use case).
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A permission is a representation of the right to perform a set of actions (possibly a single action) -we consider components to be the resources of the system. The permissions necessary to execute a task is the union of all permissions needed for the actions that constitute the task.
and action ∈ actions(task) } A distinction was made between three types of permissions that will be used for reasoning about LP: required permissions, internal permissions, and indirect permissions.
The required permissions of a component are the permissions that are needed by the component for successfully completing the tasks (or parts of tasks) it is responsible for. In other words, they are the permissions associated with the actions the component depends on for the tasks it provides. A Component is assumed to require permissions for all the actions in the task that follow his own contribution to the task. For instance, the External Web Client requires permissions 1 and 2 for uploading a working document (See Figure 2) . Note that this set is actually equivalent to an ideal access policy.
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The internal permissions of a component are the permissions linked to its own interfaces. A component is implicitly granted the permissions to execute all the actions defined in its own interfaces.
a ∈ actions(t) and a ∈ actions(c) }
The indirect permissions are additional permissions that might be obtained by interfering in a component's shared state. Shared state is the internal state of a component that is used by its actions. Since an action might influence another one by changing the shared state on which the other is dependent, a task can actually influence the results of another task. See the third example in Section II for a concrete example. In the case of shared state, a component is attributed permissions from another component's task that is reachable via the shared state of the latter component.
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We now come to the definition of LP. A system adheres to LP if all its components adhere to LP. A component does not adhere to LP if it, based upon the permissions attributed as described before, is capable of executing tasks it is not responsible for.
This definition is based on the fact that we assume that all behavior is executed via tasks and that we thus can relate components to users in the following way. The permissions attributed to a component determine the tasks that can be executed by this component. These tasks are related to users via the user-task assignment set. As such, a component will act on behalf of a possible set of users.
IV. IDENTIFYING LP VIOLATIONS
For the identification of LP violations, an algorithm was constructed based on the formal model. The input provided to the algorithm is threefold: a component and connector diagram, a list enumerating user-task assignments, and sequence diagrams mapping these tasks onto the component and connector diagram. The algorithm (See Figure 3) iterates over the different components, attributes permissions to each component, and verifies whether each component violates LP. The output of the algorithm lists the LP violations, specifying the violating component, the permissions causing the violation, and the conflicting tasks.
The algorithm can been parameterized with several options, two of which will be discussed here. A first option is the order in which the components will be iterated over. This order controls the assignment of indirect permissions, because these are propagated via the shared state of other components. Our algorithm currently starts with calculating permissions for "leaf node" components. Next, it follows these tasks in reverse order to determine the one-but-last components to calculate the permissions of, and so forth. Other propagation strategies such as root-node propagation could be considered as well.
Another option is the shared state approximation strategy. This determines the shared state between tasks in a component and thus controls the indirect permissions that are assigned to components. At this moment, the shared state is determined based on equivalence of the name and the type of the parameters of an action: if two methods share an equivalent parameter, they are considered capable of influencing each other. This is clearly a rough approximation of the shared state. 4 This is illustrated in Figure 2 , where the shared state of methods m1, m2, and m5 in component Calendar is approximated by the event parameter they all have. Other strategies could consist in working with semantic method annotations (such as preand postconditions) or on explicit annotations regarding shared state.
V. RESOLVING LP VIOLATIONS
Different strategies exist to accommodate LP in a software architectural structure, among which: (i) splitting components into several isolated units and lowering privileges assigned to these units, (ii) rewiring the architecture (i.e. rerouting tasks to other components in order to split up conflicting privileges), (iii) splitting tasks such that less privileges have to be attributed to different components, or (iv) applying well-known solutions and patterns (such as sandboxing) to introduce LP in selected parts of the architecture (see Section VIII). Due to space constraints, we only elaborate on the first strategy. Several other strategies have been further worked out in a technical report [7] .
One of the challenges in splitting a component is that it has to be split in a way that preserves the semantics of the component: semantically related actions must remain adjacent even after splitting. The knowledge available for splitting is typically limited to the interfaces of the component, the actions described in these interfaces, and the parameters of these actions. Our approach uses these parameters to approximate the related actions by applying a variant of the shared state approximation strategy on all possible subsets of the component's actions. However, in order to split a component that contains related actions which are used by violating tasks, we require extra information to be present in the architectural description: read/write on the action's parameters (see transformation itself).
A. Splitting a component
If two tasks are delegated to a component via two actions, and the internal or required permissions associated with these actions cause a LP violation, then, based upon the shared state between the tasks, the component can be split as follows (See Figure 4) The rule does not work if two tasks both write on the shared state, because these tasks can still influence each other via these components. In other words, the indirect permissions of both components will not have been decreased. Based on the model of section III, it is easy to see that the privileges will reduce for one of the following reasons.
First, partitioning a component will result in subcomponents each having less internal permissions by definition.
Second, partitioning a component in a way each partition is responsible for less tasks, will result in partitions requiring less required permissions by definition.
Third, if a component that grants indirect permissions to another component is split, then it is possible that these indirect permissions are not granted anymore, because the shared state propagating these indirect permissions does not exist anymore. Hence, the number of indirect permissions of that other component is lower or equal than the number of indirect permissions before splitting.
The attentive reader might have noticed that the above strategy can lead to multiple solutions, mainly because a set of actions can be partitioned in multiple ways. Therefore, a strategy is needed that searches the best possible solution. Such a strategy ranks the identified violations, which can be based on several metrics. For instance, solve the violation whose solution does not significantly change other architectural qualities such as size or complexity first (See also Section VI).
VI. APPLYING THE RESULTS ON SEVERAL CASE STUDIES
This section presents the validation results of the presented approach. In particular, the goal was to assess whether the LP properties of the software architecture improved, while other software architecture qualities such as size, complexity, or security properties did not deteriorate. The evaluation was based on an implementation of the identifying and solving techniques described earlier.
In the rest of the section, one particular case study is first elaborated upon in order to appreciate the type of problems and solutions that can be addressed in practice. Afterwards, a summary of the results of applying the approach to several case studies will be discussed from a broader perspective.
A. Detailed validation results
The case study used in this section involves a subset of the requirements and architecture of a digital publishing system. The complete description is available in [20] . The system automates the cross-media publishing workflow of a corporate publishing company. Its main features are input management, user management, and content management and distribution.
A wide range of different actors make use of this system, among which the advertiser, the journalist, and the manager. The advertiser is the main income source of the company because he buys commercial space or time. The journalist forms the bridge between consumers and producers by using the publishing system to distribute finished content. The manager manages the publishing company by creating a publishing strategy and assigning tasks to journalists.
Obviously, the execution of each of these tasks is restricted to certain actors. For instance, a journalist is not allowed to create a corporate strategy, because that requires too much responsibility.
In the architecture, components responsible for these features are the following. An Media Advertising System (MAS) is used by Advertisers to submit produced commercials to be stored in the Content Management System. The Content Management System (CMS) is responsible for storing and retrieving content items, and a Journalist News Desk is responsible for making content ready to be published. The Planning System (PS) is used by both Journalists and Managers to manage their planning and assign tasks.
We discuss some of the problems that have been identified in the Planning System. A first problem is that the Planning System is responsible for the plan corporate strategy and plan edition strategy tasks. The former is executed by a manager, while the latter is executed by a journalist. Having permissions for both tasks was explicitly forbidden by the company policy (as illustrated in Figure 5 ). A second problem is that the advertiser is able to obtain enough permissions to modify the advertisement workflow (part of planning tasks) (See Figure 6) . The design problem is that planning system is responsible for both notification and edition planning tasks.
A solution to these problems can be found by applying the transformation described in Section V. The first problem can be solved by splitting the component in two parts. The first part contains actions related to corporate strategy, while the second part contains actions related to edition planning. The second problem can be solved by decoupling notification from creation. As such, the risk of LP violations in the final software architecture will be greatly reduced.
B. Broader validation results
In this section, the quality of the presented approach is assessed quantitatively. For this purpose, the impact of our algorithms on size, complexity, and security was measured. Size and complexity were selected because our solution strategy impacts these explicitly: it creates new components, introduces additional dependencies, and so forth. Size was measured by the number of components, the number of interfaces per component, and the number of actions per interface, while complexity was measured by CBMC [21] , connector complexity [35] , and McCabe [23] for architecture. Security was selected because our strategy should improve the LP security properties of a software architecture, but not invalidate or deteriorate other security properties such as the size of the attack surface. LP was measured by the number of violating components, and the number of tasks causing the violation, while the attack surface was measured by a (simplified version of a) metric defined by Manadhata [22] . 5 Table II the application of the approach on the three architectures from three different domains: a modified version of the small chat application example delivered with ArchStudio [11] (case1), a conference management system [25] (case2), and (a subset of) the publishing system [20] (ps sub and ps full).
The first analysis examined whether system size (#comp) worsened after the application of our approach. In general, this was indeed the case. While the smaller case studies growed in size with 1 or 2 components, the publishing case almost doubled in size. Indeed, large systems might require more conflicting permissions to solve, because (i) their components have more actions, and (ii) they support more tasks. The increase for small systems is still acceptable, while the increase for the large system is not. Note, however, that this number can be reduced by lowering the number of false positives in the violation set or by improving the architectural transformations.
The second analysis examined whether component size (#inf/#comp and #acts/#inf) worsened after the application of our approach, which was not the case. Indeed, if a component is split, the number of actions per interface decreases as a subset of these are moved to another component.
The third analysis examined whether complexity (Mccb.) increased. In general, this was the case. A possible explanation for this is that dependencies, one of the main parameters of complexity, between the old set of components and the newly created components are introduced. This increase in complexity is considered acceptable.
The fourth analysis examined whether LP improved (in terms of the number of violating components (# viol comps), and tasks causing a violation (#viol tasks) after the application of our approach. In general, LP did improve. However, in two cases (case2 and ps full) an improvement was not noticed. This might be caused by the inability of the transformation to identify a set of subcomponents that each contain a different violating action. These numbers are remarkably high, which might indicate that the approximation of indirect permissions produces a significant number of false positives.
The fifth analysis examined how the attack surface was impacted. In general, this was not the case, which is plausible since two of the main parameters of attack surface, indirect entry points and untrusted data items, are not influenced by the transformation. However, in case 2 the attack surface increased, because it increases the number of indirect entry points by creating shared state update methods based on existing indirect entry points, which count as indirect entry points as well.
In conclusion, we could say that our detection algorithm detects least privilege violations, but has a high rate of false positives. Our splitting transformation works if the components that have to be split, are divisible in subcomponents, which mainly depends on the size of the shared state.
VII. DISCUSSION
A number of observations driven by the results of our experiments are worth further discussion. The identified approach and transformations have at least the following limitations.
The identified transformations do not always work well: sometimes it is not possible to split the component in subcomponents, because two violating tasks both use an action or a group of actions to update shared state. Hence these actions can not be be part of two components. Possible solutions are (i) using smarter ways for creating subcomponents (e.g., another shared state identification algorithm), and (ii) creating new transformations that are not based on splitting architectural elements to solve LP violations, like splitting tasks.
On the other hand, one should also carefully ponder the options that influence the result of the identification and solving algorithm, since naively applying it might lead to extreme architectures or might cause unwanted side affects. An extreme architecture is for instance an architecture in which every component has been split (possibly several times when many tasks passes through these components on purpose. Some security-specific components (like the Audit Interceptor [3] ) exhibit this type of behavior.
Some current assumptions considerably limited the practical applicability of the approach. First, a process typically consists of multiple components, while we assume that it consists of one. This assumption can be dropped if other architectural views such as the process or runtime view are incorporated in our model. Second, not all security relevant use cases are typically available, while we assume they are. Furthermore, there are also two limitations in the implementation of the tool: (i) no support for UML (useful for architectural diagrams), and (ii) no meaningful names for new components and interfaces.
An interesting added value of the approach is the ability to reason about separation of duty (SoD) policies at architectural level. Indeed, SoD deals with splitting and distributing tasks that, when combined, can cause a lot of damage. SoD can be seemlessly integrated in the approach as specific constraints that are imposed on particular tasks. As such, one can easily reason about SoD conflicts at architectural level.
VIII. RELATED WORK
This work is strongly related to two particular research domains: security engineering, and software refactoring. The discussion on security engineering focusses on (i) program separation, (ii) model checking, and (iii) execution monitoring.
Program separation, a technique to separate a program in multiple processes with clean interfaces, has been successfully applied in several end-user programs such as Vsftp [9] , qmail [4] , and postfix [32] to support LP. The approach presented in this paper actually provides a systematic and automated means for program separation at architectural level. Another more general approach is privilege separation [6] [19], a technique that partitions the implementation of an existing program into two processes: a privileged program called the monitor and an unprivileged program called the slave. Our approach can be considered an extension of privilege separation, because it optimizes the number of privileged processes for LP support.
Model checking techniques are used to verify whether a design meets certain properties, such as LP. In his PhD thesis [18] , Jürjens explains how one can use his UMLSec approach to enforce LP by formulating LP requirements and verifying UMLsec specifications (including policy specifications) with respect to these requirements. The major difference with this approach is that is functions independently from the access policy. Thuong Doan's UML model checking approach is similar [12] . Rubacon [14] is a tool that checks UML models and their configuration data for adherence to security policies. The tool allows to express security rules that the permissions need to satisfy in a formal way. An example of such a rule can be SoD. In essence, the tool investigates chains of information flow, such as determining user permissions from user names or roles. Rubacon and our work share an idea: identify possible (sub)tasks (transactions) that can be executed by granted permissions. However, the authors focus on the end user, while we focus on components. In addition, we propose rules for restructuring, while their tool detects violations.
Execution monitoring is another technique that limits the privileges a program is allowed to have. These techniques block system calls and/or access file and network resources based on policies. Examples are Systrace [27] , Mapbox [1] , BlueBox [8] , Consh [2] , Janus [33] , Jain and Sekar's system call interposition [17] , Peterson's general purpose API [26] and Walker's domain type enforcement [34] . The main drawback of these mechanisms that it is hard to specify policies in terms of application-specific resources and functions, because these don't always map on files and system calls (application-level versus system level-view). Schneider confirms this by arguing that these systems can only enforce LP in a meaningful way if they use application-dependent security policies that depend on the application's state along with the semantics of that applications abstractions. [31] Another drawback is that one component, the sandbox, is assigned a lot of privileges.
A lot of work has been published in the area of software refactoring. Mens [24] presents a detailed survey. Software refactoring is generally viewed as the process of improving the internal structure of a software system without disrupting its external behaviour [13] . This improvement of the internal structure can be based on a specific quality goal, such as modifiability, security [16] , or in our case least privilege. While refactoring can be applied, no concrete results for LP are available in this area to the knowledge of the authors.
IX. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a technique that improves the identification and resolution of LP violations in software architectures.
To this aim, the concept of architecture-level LP has been modelled formally. This model was used to create an algorithm that indicates when an architecture violates LP. Subsequently, an architectural transformation that solves a subset of these violations was proposed. The approach has been validated by means of several case studies which indicate that, overall, properties such as the number of violations and the average component size improve, while other software properties such as system size, system complexity, and attack surface are negatively affected.
While this work is a first milestone in this context, many opportunities and issues remain. The focus of (near term) future work will be threefold. First, the false positive rate should be further reduced such that the outcome of the violation identification algorithm is more usable. A first idea in that direction is to split the different types of permissions and work with weighted violation detection. Second, other architectural views (e.g., process view) can be included in order to make the technique more applicable. Finally, architectural refactorings that preserve the architectural semantics, possibly aided by special-purpose architectural annotations, can be significantly improved. In that context, the alternatives described in the paper will be further studied, implemented and tested throroughly.
